We construct an agent-based model of the online electronics market, consisting of 10,000 buyers and 50 sellers. Buyers repeatedly interact with sellers, searching for high quality and low price, but only some buyers know seller quality prior to purchase. Buyers may learn seller quality directly or from information obtained from other buyers or else estimate quality through market share heuristics. We examine the efficacy of these learning and estimation methods and find that preferential searching, where the probability of searching any seller is its market share, leads to higher consumer surplus and significantly lower levels of price dispersion.
Introduction
A decade ago, some researchers suggested electronic marketplaces (Bakos, 1997) and internet shopping would allow nearly frictionless transactions, with shop-bots helping buyers effortlessly search the web for the best deals (Maes, 1999; Sahlman, 1999; Sinha, 2000) . Online markets do seem to have lower overall prices and price variability than their physical counterparts but factors such as switching costs, variable transaction costs, and information asymmetry may limit their efficiency. Even markets without these three factors can be inefficient when buyers do not obtain information about all sellers. Indeed, despite intense competition and the widespread adoption of internet shopping, price dispersion persists online (e.g., Lindsey-Mullikin and Grewal, 2006) .
Price dispersion is the term for the same good or service selling for different prices. This dispersion violates the Law of One Price, where identical products are identically priced in all markets, and its presence is often taken to indicate market inefficiency. Even the seemingly simple concept of price, however, has some complexity. Firms frequently change prices to move inventory or help build market share. A listed price may not be the same for all customers, due to taxes, shipping costs, and discounts for new or loyal customers. Even if researchers control for these factors, however, price dispersion may merely reflect genuine differences in product or seller quality.
For differentiated products, higher quality naturally commands a higher price. However, quality differences may be present even for commoditised products. Exogenous factors, like service quality, may be inseparable from the products themselves. Online, the impact of many such service quality factors (e.g., location, parking availability, operating hours, appearance of stores and sales staff) is minimised (Kim et al., 2004) , making online markets an ideal area to study price dispersion. This is not to say service quality is unimportant online but that the number of distinct, significant variables may be reduced.
Empirical studies have often taken a snapshot approach, observing price dispersion among a stable set of market leaders over a relatively short period. Obviously, price dispersion is more meaningful if it occurs among a group of equally profitable firms; Pitt et al. (2001) is a notable exception to the general neglect of profitability. Sellers may enter or exit the market over time; although stories of failing dot-coms were widely publicised, many traditional firms eventually shifted operations online. Buyer populations and characteristics also change over time. Any observed price dispersion may be more or less persistent, depending on how fast buyers gather information compared to how quickly that information becomes obsolete.
It is often difficult to compare existing studies across industries and times, because different factors may drive price dispersion in different markets. Yet, factors like buyers' price insensitivity and products' price and complexity are known to contribute to price dispersion. A model integrating these factors could facilitate research comparisons, promote deeper understanding of mechanisms inhibiting market efficiency, help identify new variables of interest, determine sustainable levels of price dispersion, and ultimately provide better predictions of market efficiency trends. That motivation underlies our developing an agent-based model of an online retail market.
Efficient markets do not arise ex nihilo but through buyer-seller interactions. Because market participants act independently, markets are a natural application for agent-based models, which produce macro-level effects from micro-level behaviour (Tesfatsion, 2003) . In principle, if agent behaviours are accurately modelled, the resulting complex environments can also be described. Given adequate data to build behaviour rules, agent-based models may be more accurate than typical statistical approaches. The regression models typical of prior research may only be valid over the range of available data, require normally distributed independent variables, and yield linear relationships between variables. Compared to statistical models, agent-based models may have better predictive power, more easily incorporate skewed data, and enable analysis of more complex variable interactions.
We build an agent-based model of an online market, tracking price dispersion over time. The model incorporates value-seeking buyers and profit-seeking sellers, search costs, and different ways that buyers may obtain and evaluate seller information, including social communication among buyers. As developing an all-encompassing model is beyond the scope of a single paper, we narrow our focus through certain restrictive assumptions. Buyers do not use market-wide search tools, while sellers stock one identical product and have a monolithic quality parameter. That is, quality includes all product and service quality differences and is objectively measurable and equally valued by all buyers. Obviously, these are simplifications; for example, buyers do not value quality equally or by the same criteria (Browne et al., 2007) and prior research has suggested how sellers might maximise profits by offering value-added components to core products based on varied customer preferences (Bhargava and Choudhary, 2004) . Still, most online shoppers are goal-oriented rather than experiential (Wolfinbarger and Gilly, 2001 ) and define online service quality by relatively objective criteria; online shoppers have more similar preference profiles than shoppers at traditional stores.
We evaluate market price dispersion in terms of price and quality for all sellers. Assume a market price k for a product with quality zero and let buyers be willing to pay one unit of price for each additional unit of quality. Then, in a perfectly competitive market, a seller of quality q should sell at price p = k + q. Real price dispersion (i.e., adjusted for quality) can be measured by the standard deviation of (q -p) among all sellers. Market efficiency, on the other hand, can be defined in terms of consumer surplus; all else equal, when competition is less intense, sellers can charge higher prices. Consumer surplus is simply (q -p), the excess of buyer benefits over cost. This paper extends Lundquist and Bhattacharyya (2006) , in which buyers knew seller quality after search but prior to purchase. In this paper, most buyers cannot accurately assess seller quality prior to purchase; instead, they must learn or estimate it. How to estimate seller quality is an old question but the emergence of online retailing (and the host of new firms selling solely through it) gave it a new form. Market share can be an important determinant of perceived seller quality; many buyers are reluctant to shop at an unknown online retailer, typically being concerned with security, reliability, and conflict resolution. Returning to our earlier example, in an efficient market, a seller of quality q selling its product for less than (k + q) would have above-average market share. However, in an inefficient market, estimating seller quality through market share may perpetuate the inefficiency.
It is reasonable to assume that wider availability and faster absorption of market knowledge should cause markets to more quickly reach an efficient equilibrium. However, when buyers receive inaccurate information, this may not be true (Lundquist and Bhattacharyya, 2006) . Similarly, when buyers use flawed heuristics, increased information may impede efficiency. In this paper, we will examine the consequences of using market share relative to price as a proxy for quality. Thereby, we will also demonstrate our model's ability to incorporate a wide range of buyer and seller behaviours.
A key contribution of this paper is in the development of an agent-based model of an online retail market. Using this model, we examine the interaction of different seller quality evaluation and information gathering methods on market efficiency. Our approach has relevance for academics and practitioners. For academics, it offers a basic framework for modelling the connections between price, quality, market share, and profitability. It also models two types of social communication. Finally, it advances beyond the traditional regression-based approach to price dispersion typically found in the IS literature, facilitating analysis of non-linear relationships, non-normally distributed populations, and buyer memory. For practitioners, the agent-based approach may indicate which information acquisition methods are most conducive to attracting customers and therefore what actions sellers should take to signal quality. Stigler (1961) pointed out the significance of search on market efficiency; locating and evaluating a seller has an associated cost. His paper linked price dispersion and search cost, the cost of learning about sellers. Assume a product price p arising from perfect competition, known to all buyers, and a search cost c, constant for all buyers. Then, the total cost of the product and search is (p + c). Any seller may then charge up to (p + c) and still be superior to a hypothetical subsequent seller charging p. If p remains constant over time and buyers make frequent purchases, the search cost c may be distributed over multiple purchases; if, however, prices change often, then a search conducted for one purchase is unlikely to remain relevant for subsequent ones.
Literature review

Search theory
For researching individual customer behaviour, the search cost construct has not only empirical validation but also strong intuitive appeal. When search cost is low, buyers will search a wider range of sellers, up to where search cost is zero and buyers search the entire market. However, direct search is obviously not the only way buyers acquire information. Advertising (Ozga, 1960) and word-of-mouth are two alternatives. Search cost can therefore be viewed not merely as a hurdle for individual buyers optimising particular transactions but as one of several barriers preventing all buyers from learning all available market information.
Buyers may use different search techniques. Kohn and Shavell (1974) summarised general search principles and Agrawal et al. (2005) provides a concise survey of major search models. For example, when search cost is dominated by travel, models may assume that search follows a fixed order and buyers do not return to rejected sellers; online, however, buyers have wider latitude in their search order. Morgan and Manning (1985) identified conditions under which fixed sample size, sequential, or other search strategies are optimal. Rothschild (1974) showed that price distribution knowledge does not substantially affect buyer search behaviour.
Search may be decomposed into search depth, how many sellers are evaluated during a search, and search frequency, how often customers conduct searches at all. All else equal, we can reasonably expect buyers to search more frequently and deeply when search cost is low; however, this expectation may not always be justified. Customers may find it expedient to trade depth for frequency or vice versa; for example, in markets where prices change often and buyers make frequent purchases, increasing search frequency might yield better information than less frequent, deeper searches.
Buyer-seller interactions
Following Stigler, researchers modelled price dispersion equilibria under specific buyer search strategies. Researchers considered informed and uninformed customer segments (Stiglitz and Salop, 1977) , differences in buyer search strategies (Schwartz and Wilde, 1979) , how price dispersion can develop even with homogeneous buyers and sellers (Burdett and Judd, 1983) , the combined effects of seller competition and buyers' learning through purchasing (Bergemann and Välimäki, 1996) , how and when online sellers might reduce search costs to increase customer satisfaction (Lynch and Ariely, 2000) , and relative power of buyers and sellers (Pitt et al., 2001 ). Some agent-based research has also been published; Tesfatsion (2003) provides a thorough overview of major papers in agent-based computational economics. Some insights have also arisen indirectly; Kirman and Vriend (2001) showed that prices might fall as a consequence of loyalty between buyers and sellers, though their primary focus was neither price dispersion nor search cost.
There is also the question of the accuracy of information from searches. Researchers have examined market share as a heuristic for estimating seller quality (Caminal and Vives, 1996) . The relationship between market share and quality may be positive, as in signalling or network externalities, or negative, as in exclusivity. Hellofs and Jacobson (1999) concluded that, for well-known brands, high market share is generally perceived to indicate lower quality; this result, however, did not consider quality differences for products offered at the same price. Obviously, in purely instrumental terms, buyers would be expected to prefer higher quality for a given price. If quality is taken to mean "what the buyer wants", it becomes tautological to associate stronger preferences with higher quality. Thus, for commoditised products, it is reasonable to use market share to estimate quality for a given price.
Product classes
In the internet era, research has often focused on particular product categories. Price dispersion has been measured in online sales of: books and CDs (Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000) ; electronics (Baylis and Perloff, 2001 ); airline tickets (Clemons et al., 2002) ; groceries (Degaratu et al., 2000) ; and cars (Morton et al., 2001) . Researchers have also evaluated the impact of automated search tools (Alba, 1997; Häubl and Trifts, 2000; Diehl et al., 2003) . Häubl and Trifts (2000) observed that, while search tools can find superior combinations of price and quality, many customers use them to reduce search effort. Diehl et al. (2003) noted that search tools are generally much more suited to sorting by price than by quality. Degaratu et al. (2000) proposed that brands can be a valid alternative source of quality information which is otherwise difficult to obtain. Overall, prior research shows that the relative importance of price dispersion factors can be highly specific to particular markets.
Despite the general observation that price dispersion is lower online than in physical stores, internet retailing has not always produced efficient markets. Retail electronics goods (Baylis and Perloff, 2001 ) not only show significant price dispersion but invert the expected positive price-quality relationship. Even worse for buyers, this inversion persisted over the one-year span of the study. The authors suggested two primary causes for this inversion: first, the related variables of product complexity and low customer knowledge make accurate quality assessments difficult, and second, the infrequency of such purchases creates a pool of uninformed buyers who essentially choose sellers at random, allowing the low-quality, high-price sellers to remain in business.
Model design parameters
Although extremely low search costs may eliminate price dispersion, high search cost might lead to higher average prices rather than dispersed ones. Consider a seller of some commodity good, with an established set of buyers and in a market where search costs are identical for any buyer to search any seller. A buyer searches other sellers only if he believes he might find a better price and will not buy from another seller unless he actually finds a better price. This seller can therefore charge higher than the market, provided the difference is less than the search cost. This seller also may not lower its price by less than this difference, as it will receive less revenue from his established buyers, without attracting any new ones. This point, however, applies equally to all sellers and therefore search cost alone may not create price dispersion. Instead, the sellers' drive to maximise profits could make market prices higher than would occur under perfect competition and lower search cost.
For price dispersion to persist, then, we propose that other contributing factors must also be present. While many mechanisms may lead to price dispersion, we believe some sellers must be able to exploit price differences or lack of customer information or choice, in ways that others are not. Possible mechanisms are: switching costs; attracting customers through advertising; customer loyalty; differences in buyers' price sensitivity or ability to evaluate sellers; differences in sellers' cost structures; or that good sellers seek to establish long-term relationships with buyers, through consistently lower prices and higher quality, while the bad ones seek to maximise their profit per sale. Because price dispersion has so many potential sources, we do not simulate them all directly. Instead, our model follows four principles which we believe capture the most important factors leading to price dispersion.
The first principle is that search cost prevents buyers from searching the entire spectrum of sellers and from conducting a search for each purchase. Obviously, with homogeneous buyers, products, and seller quality, all buyers would buy from the lowest-price seller if they knew the whole market. We do not decompose search cost but, for online shoppers, this disincentive is time and effort, as in Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) .
Second, buyers iteratively search to maximise their individual consumer surplus, measured by (q -p) for each purchase, while the incremental costs from each search are less than the expected benefits. The inequality to be satisfied here is that the search cost must be less than [P(gain) E(gain from finding a better seller)]. For products with a low absolute price, the expected gain will naturally also be small. Lower product price has been associated with low search frequency and depth; for example, most online shoppers buy relatively inexpensive items like books (89%), CDs (81%), and toys (84%) without searching more than one seller (Baker et al., 2001) . Surprisingly, though, 76% of electronics purchases were also made without search (Baker et al., 2001 ). For such purchases (i.e., without search), buyers typically return to familiar sellers.
Our third principle is therefore that buyers retain information about recently searched sellers and display habitual purchase behaviour. Since prices are temporary and thus today's second-best seller may be tomorrow's best, buyers for a time remember sellers with a price-quality offering close to that of the seller they did purchase from. These sellers will be searched first in the next search. Buyers finding a seller with a particularly unattractive price-quality offering are likely to avoid that seller for a long time. Other sellers will simply be discarded from memory but are as likely as unknown sellers to be searched for future purchases. We set search and memory parameters such that buyers tend to remember between two and six sellers at any given time; this is explained in the discussion of search depth in Section 4.3.
Fourth, sellers try to maximise profits, and do so by adjusting prices; we assume that seller quality is fixed. Given the lack of price stability for all sellers, determining the profitability of potential price changes is problematic. Therefore, sellers regularly change their prices by a small amount. When a price change leads to an increase in profits, the change is repeated in the same direction; when it leads to lower profits, the change is made in the opposite direction. As prices approach equilibrium, these directional changes will become more frequent, indicating a relatively stable price-quality relationship.
This paper makes three extensions to the simulation model from Lundquist and Bhattacharyya (2006) . First, seller quality is not necessarily known prior to a purchase; buyers must sometimes rely on reviews and signals that may not be accurate. While buyers are typically risk-averse, they also occasionally sample new sellers. To resolve this conflict, we assume the risk in evaluating seller quality equals buyers' sampling propensity; buyers treat their quality estimates as correct. Second, buyers may receive accurate quality information from other buyers. Third, buyers may consciously avoid sellers previously found to have an inferior price-quality offering. We describe these extensions in more detail in the next section.
Simulation model
We consider two types of buyers and two types of sellers. Buyers can be novices, who do not know seller quality prior to purchase, or experts, who do. Sellers may be good, having high quality relative to price, or bad, with low quality compared to price. While our model could be specified to any desired distribution of buyer and seller attributes and behaviours, our intention is to explore the usefulness of seller quality information sources. We therefore chose a market where accurate seller quality evaluation is problematic. In the electronics market, the limited usefulness of direct search (given the large pool of sellers) and difficulty of evaluating seller quality compound to make locating and identifying superior sellers challenging for most customers. Our model parameters are intended to broadly represent the consumer electronics market, as observed in Baylis and Perloff (2001) , where most sellers have low quality and charge high prices but customers act as if the market were reasonably efficient. Lundquist and Bhattacharyya (2006) identified mechanisms (pricing strategies and limited searching) enabling bad sellers to remain profitable, even when buyers were able to accurately assess quality through searching. Here, we are not attempting to replicate phenomena occurring in the electronics market but rather to evaluate the efficacy of various buyer search strategies in it.
Pricing strategy
We limit each seller to one of two pricing strategies: constrained, where sellers will not raise prices above a certain level unless losing money, or unconstrained, where sellers freely change prices, throughout a simulation run. Not all sellers may benefit from a competitive pricing strategy; those with small market share must earn more profit per transaction to cover the same fixed costs. It is therefore more natural for bad sellers to be unconstrained while good sellers might be more likely to adopt a long-term view and build market share rather than extract maximum profit per sale. As Stigler (1961) noted, bad sellers hope to capitalise on buyers' lack of market knowledge and maximise their margin on each sale.
This split should lead to competition within each seller category; bad sellers can only effectively compete against other bad sellers. The relative proportions of good and bad sellers, in combination with buyers' depth and frequency of search, may significantly impact the ability of the bad sellers to survive. Bad sellers may sustain higher prices in the presence of other bad sellers (Venkatesan et al., 2006) , first, because buyers not finding good sellers will resort to bad sellers and, second, the entire category of bad sellers may be less vulnerable to price competition.
Over time, the cumulative effects of search should gradually lead to buyers' locating the good sellers. Good sellers should not have worse survivability than bad ones, so long as the only difference between good and bad sellers is quality. However, competition can still be very intense for good sellers, because their customers (in this market) are more likely to be expert buyers. Competitive pricing can lead to good sellers with high variable costs being driven out of business.
Agent parameters
Buyers and sellers constitute the agents in our model and we consider 10,000 buyers and 50 sellers. Each run of the model consists of 100 turns, and each turn operates through the following steps:
• buyers share information about sellers
• buyers search
• buyers make purchases
• sellers calculate profit (or loss) and decide whether to exit the market or not
• sellers adjust prices
• buyers drop sellers from memory.
Each seller has a quality rating, q (from 25 to 75) and an initial selling price, p (also from 25 to 75). These price and quality levels should be viewed as strictly relative, with, for example, a quality rating of 50 merely meaning average. Seller quality represents factors common across all purchases, such as service and overall product quality. For example, a high-q seller may quickly deliver high-quality computers while a low-q seller may sell low-quality ones, or unreliably deliver average-quality ones. Seller quality remains constant for each run; we assume that the time represented does not allow changes in quality.
Sellers have variable costs (vc) and fixed costs (fc). Variable costs are 90% of the initial selling price, simulating setting initial prices to earn a small positive gross margin. We do not assume a positive relationship between variable costs and quality because, first, doing so causes a rapid convergence to a very efficient market (contradicting empirical research) and second, because low variable costs and high quality may be consequences of economies of scale. Sellers begin with retained earnings of 100,000, cushioning them against weak initial market share. Fixed costs are set to 4000 per turn, ensuring the majority of sellers will eventually exit the market; with price competition, the market is not large or profitable enough to support 50 sellers. Good sellers are, on average, much more profitable than bad ones and so the limit on retained earnings largely serves to force most bad sellers to eventually exit the market. Net income, (sales × (p -vc) -fc), accrues to retained earnings each turn.
Each buyer begins with knowledge of one randomly-determined seller. Each buyer also has a maximum buying price (from 75 to 125), reflecting awareness of 'reasonable' prices even without directly searching. Buyers do not buy at prices above their maximum. Outside of their being novices or experts, buyers have identical characteristics and behaviours except for maximum buying price.
Agent behaviours
If buyers incorrectly interpret indicators of seller quality, then having access to all seller quality indicators is insufficient to bring about market efficiency. To assess seller quality, novices may: learn it through purchases; receive information from other buyers (who are presumably more neutral than sellers); or use an estimation heuristic based on market share and price. Novices' learning about seller quality through purchases is modelled through a learning rate parameter that specifies the probability of a seller obtaining the true seller quality in a purchase. The heuristic estimates quality as p(seller's total sales/average total sales of all sellers). While this paper does not explicitly consider automated search tools, many buyers do not routinely use these tools (Baker et al., 2001) . Henceforth, any mention of seller quality q should be considered to apply equally to actual or estimated quality unless specifically noted otherwise.
Buyers search until expected gains are less than the cost of searching another seller. The buyer surplus (q -p) from the last purchase determines expected gains, E(gain). When (q -p) is negative, expected gains are set to the maximum of 1; buyers expect to find a better seller. When the surplus is above 50, a value very rarely achieved let alone sustained, expected gains are set to 0. In between, expected gains = [0.02 × (50 -(q -p))]. Although this will not exactly match the real expected gains, we consider it a reasonable estimate that has buyers searching more deeply when less satisfied with their last purchase. Buyers search new sellers if P(gain) × E(gain) > c, where c is search cost.
Each turn, buyers may search sellers. When searching, buyers first check all sellers retained in memory and then randomly locate new sellers. As buyers do not have current information on more than a few sellers, they estimate the likelihood of a new seller being better than the best one already known. Buyers assume that the distribution of unknown sellers matches that of known sellers. For example, if m sellers are known, the probability of a new seller being better is 1/(m + 1). Because it can be less onerous to search familiar sellers, those retained in memory are weighted by half for search cost. The relevant equation is P(gain) = [2/(sellers in memory + 2 × new sellers)]. For example, with c = 0.5 and E(gain) = 0.6, a buyer searches until P(gain) < 0.83 = (2/2.4); this buyer may search two new sellers (or four retained ones), which approximates recent findings that buyers typically consult two or three sellers when searching (Zhang et al., 2006) .
Buyers retain a list of recently searched sellers through the memory parameter. When a buyer initially searches a seller, the memory for that seller is initialised to 1. If the buyer buys from that seller, the corresponding memory is incremented by 1. At the end of each turn, all memories are halved. Sellers may be discarded from a buyer's list for two reasons: their associated memory falls below 0.2 or they lack a competitive offering. Let a buyer's best known seller have value v = (q -p); that buyer will discard any sellers with (q -p) < (v -5). In the rare event that a buyer's best known seller has price above the buyer's maximum purchase price p max , the best known seller is considered to be the best one with p < p max .
When a buyer drops a seller from memory, that buyer assigns that seller an avoid rating between 0 and 10; sellers with a lower (q -p) receive a higher avoid rating. In a search cycle, when a buyer randomly locates a seller with avoid > 0, that seller will not be placed in memory and the buyer will search again. However, if a buyer has made as many search attempts as that seller's avoid rating, that seller will be retained in memory; this ensures that buyers will search even avoided sellers rather than omit searching altogether. Following each buyer's search cycle, sellers with an avoid > 0 have their avoid reduced by one, ensuring that sellers are not avoided forever.
In certain runs buyers may receive information outside the direct search process through one of two methods. Buyers (either novices or experts) may learn a random expert buyer's best known seller and its quality. The other alternative is that a novice buyer may receive all of a random expert buyer's known seller quality ratings. This increased flow of information is expected to hasten progress toward market efficiency, both directly and by helping drive bad sellers out.
Sellers receive revenue from sales. Each turn, net income is calculated for each seller and applied to retained earnings. Sellers exit the market (and buyer memory) when their retained earnings fall below zero. Surviving sellers may then adjust their prices by a small random amount, in order to increase profits. Since profits might be increased by either raising or lowering prices, sellers adjust prices according to what has increased profitability recently. Initially, each seller has a random direction: up or down. At the end of each turn, sellers change their prices in that direction. Subsequently, sellers compare the current turn's profits against the previous turn's. If profits increased, the seller maintains the same direction; if profits decreased, the seller changes direction.
Sellers adjust their prices by a random amount between 0 and 4. More profitable sellers tend to keep their prices more stable. Sellers that are losing money always change their prices, those with below-average market share have a 50% probability of doing so, and profitable sellers (with at least average market share) have only a 25% probability of changing prices. Prices then gradually settle into the market price-quality relationship. In practice, sellers often change prices for reasons other than short-term profitability, e.g., to attract new customers, learn sustainable price levels, reduce inventory, or take advantage of changes in variable costs. Although these are realistic strategies, analysing them simultaneously is beyond the scope of this paper.
Results
We expect that faster market knowledge acquisition (e.g., a higher percentage of expert buyers and faster learning by novice buyers) will improve market efficiency. That is, average (q -p) should be higher when buyers are better informed. An earlier study (Lundquist and Bhattacharyya, 2006) , had explored how well our model conformed to commonly observed real-world phenomena, providing a basic validation. Increasing search depth and frequency consistently improved market efficiency. It was also observed that allowing buyers to occasionally share information about their known best sellers provided a more even market share distribution, increasing the number of surviving sellers; search was less random and the market reacted more quickly to sellers' price changes, making it less expensive to capture market share.
In this paper, we extend the same model to examine buyers' quality estimation heuristics. In Section 5.1, we present boundaries for market efficiency based on seller strategies and the ability or inability of buyers to know seller quality prior to purchase. The next three sections present the effects of changing the rate at which buyers acquire seller information: learning seller quality directly through purchases (Section 5.2) and acquiring quality information of all sellers searched by an expert (Section 5.3); and receiving an expert's best known seller (Section 5.4). Finally, in Section 5.5, we observe the effects of preferential searches based on market share.
In the results below, our focus is generally on the ending state of each run, when an approximate equilibrium is reached. The progress toward equilibrium may be different even when the final results are the same. We therefore also include some plots of how price dispersion develops over time. Each set of results presents values aggregated over 30 independent runs. For each set, we track the following results, as the average over all runs and, in parentheses, the standard deviation:
• average number of surviving sellers
• average p = average price over all sales
• average (q -p) = average (q -p) over all sales
• Raw Price Dispersion = average standard deviation of p within runs
• Adjusted Price Dispersion = average standard deviation of (q -p) within runs.
Effect of seller pricing strategy
In general, the faster the buyers learn about sellers, the faster the bad sellers will be driven out of the market. In the context of seller quality estimates, this can vary between the cases where buyers always know seller quality prior to purchase and where they never do. Seller pricing strategy is also very important. When all buyers are experts, the good sellers will be seen as being greatly superior to the bad sellers. Novices, on the other hand, use the market share heuristic to estimate seller quality. When most buyers are novices, their collective inability to identify good sellers as such causes price itself to be the dominant predictor of market share; simply, those sellers able to sustain the lowest selling price will survive.
For these runs, we used a search cost of 0.5, search frequency of 0.25, no social communication, no recommendations, and 90% bad sellers. When good sellers are constrained (C), their maximum price is q; when unconstrained (NC), their maximum price is 125; bad sellers are never constrained and always have a maximum price of 125. The probability of a novice buyer making an accurate assessment of seller quality following a purchase (learn) is 0%. We vary the percentage of experts from 100% to 10%. Figure 1 shows the changes in average (q -p), averaged over all runs for each market type, over 100 turns. Note that all four cases have a similar pattern: average (q -p) first falls, then rises. In unconstrained cases, the fall is much more pronounced. This is because all sellers tend to rapidly raise their prices. The good ones can raise prices because they are initially (and paradoxically) shielded from competing against other good sellers by the large number of bad sellers; even an all-expert buyer population provokes this effect when search depth and frequency are low. The bad sellers, on the other hand, simply follow the good sellers: when all buyers are experts, they set prices in line with their quality; when few buyers are experts, they price slightly below the good sellers, who command a slight premium due to their additional market share from the experts. Table 1 contains detailed results for each set of runs. While the ratio of experts to novices has some effect on market efficiency, seller pricing strategy has a far greater impact. When good sellers constrain their prices and bad sellers do not, novice buyers have a reliable (if slightly counter-intuitive) indicator of quality, particularly as the experts boost the market share of good sellers. On the other hand, when good sellers are unconstrained, no such signal is available. Since novices never learn seller quality, good sellers do not attract enough market share to sustain high prices. The interaction of buyer heuristics and seller pricing strategy is clearly important; if novices believed higher price indicated higher quality, they would purchase almost exclusively from bad sellers, who would in turn continuously raise their prices (to better signal quality) up to the limit of what buyers were willing to pay, at any quality. In that case, market efficiency would depend much more on the number of experts.
These results suggest that, when only good sellers have low prices, the number of novices (or how quickly novices know as much as experts) will have little impact on market efficiency. We therefore restrict the remainder of our analysis to cases with unconstrained good sellers. Such markets typically reach equilibrium with a few good sellers dominating the upper range of quality and several bad sellers making just enough sales to survive at the lower range of quality. Further, higher equilibrium values of (q -p) may be taken to indicate higher market efficiency because the sooner buyers learn about the market, the fewer bad sellers will survive and the less time good sellers' prices have to rise before stabilising. 
Effect of the learning rate
For these runs, we consider the impact of buyers' learning rate. For a given market, as novices learn faster about sellers, the market equilibrium should approach that of an otherwise identical market where all buyers are experts. That is, as novices are better informed on seller quality, their buying decisions will more closely match those of experts. However, as we saw in the previous section, this may not significantly improve market efficiency; the difference between the cases with all experts and all novices was small. This set of runs has search cost = 0.5, search frequency = 0.25, no social communication, recommendations, and 90% bad sellers. The percentage of experts ranged from 1% to 50%. The probability of a novice buyer learning accurate seller quality following a purchase (learn) varied from 10% to 50%.
These runs (Table 2) do not show any particularly strong patterns. This is simply because a small number of experts can bring about an efficient market as quickly as a large number. Even when the number of experts is very small, changing the learning rate has little effect on market efficiency; this is like the case where very few buyers can ever know seller quality and the others choose sellers nearly at random. Overall, learning seller quality through purchases is a slow and ineffective method of gaining market knowledge given a large seller population; learning one seller's quality provides no information about the others. Using aggregated or condensed information from multiple searches is more likely to improve market efficiency. Table 2 Effects of buyer learning rate
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Effect of the sharing rate
This section examines the effect of information sharing among buyers through social ties. Sharing refers to novices receiving quality information on all sellers that have been searched by a particular expert and is modelled through the sharing rate which specifies the probability of a novice buyer receiving a random expert buyer's information. Sharing effectively turns novices into experts. Over time, experts search a large fraction of all sellers. When this seller quality information is shared with novices, they are more likely to assess a given set of sellers accurately. This is particularly important when quality estimates are likely to be inaccurate. Still, even a very high sharing rate can, at most, only turn novices into experts. It may be that the higher market share going to good sellers is a very strong quality indicator and thus that even a small group of experts occasionally sharing information with novices can provide the same level of market efficiency as an all-expert buyer population. This set of runs has search cost = 0.5, search frequency = 0.25, no recommendations, 90% bad sellers, and 90% novice buyers. The share rate is varied from 10% to 25%; we consider its interaction with learning by also varying the learn rate from 10% to 50%.
These results (Table 3) show that the sharing rate does not significantly affect market efficiency, as unless buyers have accurate quality information on all sellers located in a search, they are unlikely to choose the best one. This incomplete coverage also explains why learning has little effect in conjunction with sharing. However, for market types where large expert populations lead to substantially higher efficiency, it may well be that the share parameter also holds greater influence. For example, if good sellers have constrained prices and novice buyers use price as a proxy for quality, (as opposed to the market share heuristic) seller behaviour will change dramatically; bad sellers at first will sharply raise their prices then lower them as novice buyers discover their low quality. In that case, the more often sharing occurs (and the deeper and more often the sharing experts themselves search), the more quickly novices will behave as experts. 
Effect of the recommendation rate
Buyers may also recommend sellers to each other, allowing individual buyers to benefit from the search efforts of others. This is distinct from sharing, in that recommending inserts the seller from which an expert last purchased into a buyer's memory. This should force the market to converge to equilibrium much more rapidly. It should also purge the market of more bad sellers, as the good ones will more rapidly build market share. This, however, also depends on how fast novice buyers learn the quality of alternative sellers located through search. One might expect the interaction of recommendations and sharing to be significant for market efficiency. This set of runs has search cost = 0.5, search frequency = 0.25, 90% bad sellers, and 90% novice buyers. The values for learn are 10% and 50% and those for share are 10% and 25%. Buyers occasionally receive seller recommendations from a random expert seller, at a rate rec of 5% or 10%.
We did not find that recommendations significantly affected market efficiency (Table 4) ; buyers are not always able to use recommendations effectively. When novices receive recommendations to good sellers, they may still buy from bad sellers due to their inaccurate quality estimates. In fact, novices may avoid buying from those good sellers in the future due to a perceived lack of quality; thus, recommendations may actually make novices less likely to buy from good sellers. In effect, this is sticker shock; buyers are scared off and may not soon return. 
Preferential searching
Having looked at various degrees of learning and sharing, we have observed that they do not significantly improve market efficiency in this market. However, until now we have considered buyers (both experts and novices) to search sellers entirely at random. We now consider the effect of having search order influenced by market share; this represents phenomena such as buyers searching for specific sellers (i.e., advertising effects) or sellers being ranked in search engines (where larger sellers generate more traffic and are likely to be ranked higher). Buyers using preferential search take the seller's market share as the probability of locating it in a search iteration. In these runs, buyers have a probability (pref ) between 25% and 75% of searching preferentially; otherwise, searching is random. This set of runs has search cost = 0.5, search frequency = 0.25, 90% bad sellers, and 90% novice buyers. Table 5 shows results from buyers' using preferential search. Clearly, searching based on market share has a very strong effect on market efficiency. In fact, preferential searching by itself can improve efficiency; when pref = 75%, learn = 0%, and share = 0%, average (q -p) is almost as high as in the unconstrained cases from Section 5.1. Preferential searching is comparable to seller pricing strategy in its impact on market efficiency; given a stable group of sellers having fixed quality, it provides seller quality signals that are generally accurate, even when buyers do not search often or to great depth.
Average (q -p) is generally higher than in the previous three sections, especially for the runs with pref = 75%, though it shows too much variation to be significant. However, the mean σ (q -p) for pref = 75% is almost a full standard deviation lower than results in those sections, indicating significance at p < 0.05. Even when few experts are present, the effect of preferential searching compounds over time; the experts, having located the best sellers, give them additional market share, which then becomes the basis for attracting novices. Once a seller has built a substantial market share, novices assume it has better than average quality for its price and, indeed, are often correct. Somewhat surprisingly, however, learn and share rates do not significantly affect (q -p) in conjunction with preferential search. This is because when novices acquire information more quickly, sellers are freed from competing on price and the good sellers command a quality premium. The overall market price level climbs accordingly. If all buyers were experts, the good sellers would immediately begin raising their prices, while the bad sellers would keep theirs fairly constant, as they begin at a low level of profitability. The trade-off between these two effects (experts building market share for good sellers and novices forcing sellers to keep prices low) suggests that, within this market type, the expert-novice ratio can determine market efficiency in a non-linear relationship.
These results have implications for search tools. When quality is difficult to measure, ranking search results by market share in conjunction with price may yield market-wide benefits for buyers. However, this approach would limit competition, particularly in markets where new sellers frequently emerge, by making it even more difficult for new sellers to gain market share. Instead, it might be more suited for markets with fairly stable seller populations, allowing market opinion on seller quality to be displayed together with price.
Limitations and future work
This paper has presented an agent-based model of an online market to examine how market efficiency relates to the availability of seller quality information. It considers different ways in which buyers obtain and evaluate seller information, and includes buyer memory of recent search and information sharing through social communication. The model considers a few 'expert' buyers that are able to obtain seller quality information prior to purchase and other 'novice' buyers who must evaluate seller quality indirectly; novices in the model can learn seller quality through purchases, estimate it from a market share heuristic and obtain seller information from expert buyers, and the study examines how these can affect market efficiency. It also considers preferential searching by market share where search order is influenced by the sellers' rank on market share. Sellers in the model are profit-seeking and categorised as 'good' or 'bad' based on high or low quality relative to price.
An earlier study had found market efficiency to improve with increased search depth and frequency. Results from experiments in this paper indicate that learning seller quality from purchases is not effective for gaining market knowledge when there are many sellers. Information sharing, as implemented in the model, is also not found to be significant in terms of improving market efficiency. Preferential search, however, shows a stronger effect on market efficiency. Explanations for these, in terms of agent behaviours in the model, and implications have been discussed in the previous section.
The experimental study in this paper highlights the value of an agent-based model for investigating market efficiency and price dispersion in different market contexts and with varied agent behaviours. Results obtained here point to interesting issues for study in future work. These include the interaction of price dispersion and profitability, the effect of seller pricing strategy and how this may signal quality, the role of information sharing in a growing pool of expert buyers, and taking closer look at how sellers' pricing interacts with buyer behaviours under different learning, sharing and preferential search conditions. The model provides various parameters to allow flexible experimentation; while these have been set at generally reasonable values for our initial work here, future research should examine the sensitivity of results to these. Relating parameter values to different markets and conditions also presents a useful area for future work. The model can also be extended to consider more complex buyer attributes and shopping patterns, and multiple product types at each seller. Real world price and purchase data can also be used to directly simulate particular markets; it will be interesting to model specific real-world markets and compare the varying impacts of factors influencing market efficiency.
